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I. INTRODUCTION
I met Sheldon Halpern several decades ago when he decided to leave
corporate practice and become a full-time teacher. I was immediately
impressed by the warmth of his personality and his intense interest in
intellectual property law. From that time on, we never lost contact. Halpern
was one of those people who "knew no strangers" and was blessed with so
many friendships both in the United States and abroad. I immediately knew he
would be a credit to our teaching profession, and my guess was right on.
Halpern had a distinguished career as a teacher and a scholar. He organized
several outstanding conferences, which he orchestrated with panache-
Halpern at his generous, outgoing best.
Although we never served on the same faculty, we kept in touch regularly
and we always picked up where we left off. He was family. I used to kid him
by saying that he reminded me of my Uncle Manny from the Bronx. We
always had things to talk about, whether we were discussing law or life or
anything else. We sometimes disagreed on some legal issues, but it was always
fun to see Halpern trying to set you straight. One issue of continuous debate
was about the right of publicity, a subject on which Halpern was a recognized
expert. So, in this remembrance of my dear friend, I would like to single out
one of Halpern's contributions to the literature, his justification of the right of
publicity, which he called the "associative value of personality."I
Halpern's espousal of the right of publicity differed from his colleagues in
the field who have largely disdained this newest right in the domain of
*Professor of Law, Indiana University, Maurer School of Law, Distinguished
Scholar in Intellectual Property Law and University Fellow.
I See generally Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial
Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1199 (1986)
[hereinafter Halpern, Publicity]; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation
of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value ofPersonality, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
853 (1995) [hereinafter Halpern, Associative Value].
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intellectual property.2 For the most part, lP scholars in the academy
overwhelmingly take the position that we have improperly extended
intellectual property rights to the detriment of the public domain and, as such,
have almost uniformly expressed a disdain for the right of publicity. Professor
Halpern was not of this opinion, however, finding a solid basis for this
relatively new right. I found it refreshing that Halpern took a position contrary
to so many of his colleagues in presenting a cogent argument in favor of the
right of publicity. I have chosen this topic as a basis for my remembrance
because it illustrates the way in which Halpern approached his chosen subject
matter.
Before discussing Halpern's justification of publicity rights, I would like
to present a brief overview of the right.
II. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY REVISITED
The "right of publicity" appeared for the first time in 1953 in Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.3 Judge Frank explained its
basis as an economic rather than personal right:
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy .. ., a
man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph ... [and] to grant the
exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may
validly be made "in gross" .....
This right might be called a "right of publicity." 4
The right of publicity quickly became a "formalized property right,"
distinct from the right of privacy, that enjoys "all the attributes of property,"
which includes transferability of the right.5 In the years after Haelan, the right
of publicity has "taken hold" in a spectacular manner and is now established
by statute or common law in most states. 6 In its various state-law iterations,
the right of publicity has taken shape into an almost boundless, descendible,
and assignable property right.7 The problem is that the subject matter of the
right and its transferability differs appreciably between states.8 Periodically,
2For a comprehensive polemic criticizing the right of publicity, see generally
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REv. 125 (1993).
3 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)
(concerning the use of baseball player images on cards).
4 Id.
5 Marshall Leaffer, The Right of Publicity: A Comparative Perspective, 70 ALB. L.
REv. 1357, 1360 (2007).
6 Id.
7 Id
274 [Vol. 78:2
IN MEMORIAM: PROFESSOR HALPERN
the notion of a harmonized federal law of the right has been debated, but so
far, no unifying federal statue has emerged.9
Since its advent in U.S. law in 1953, the contours of the right of publicity
have grown to embrace not only name and likeness, but also anything roughly
relating to identity. 10
These new identifiers comprise of objects associated with the celebrity's
fame such as a racecar driver's car,11 a football player's nickname
(Crazylegs),1 2 a catch phrase identified with a talk show host (Here's
Johnny), 13 a distinctive voice (Bette Midler), 14 the likeness of a television
personality (Vanna White),1 5 and a pitcher's stance (Don Newcombe)1 6 to list
a few examples.17
But why extend the right of publicity to encompass such tenuous attributes
of identity such as nicknames, objects, and catchphrases? The search for a
rationale for a right to publicity runs the gamut from natural law to various
instrumentalist, incentive-based justifications.18 In my view, these attempts to
validate the right of publicity are largely unpersuasive, whether based on
Lockean labor theory and various concepts of human dignity or more
instrumentalist justifications, like those supporting copyright or patent law to
encourage the investment in the development of persona or to properly
allocate scarce resources. 19
III. SHELDON HALPERN AND ASSOCIATIVE VALUE OF PERSONALITY
Unlike some of his colleagues in academia, Halpern never took a reflex
reaction against a robust regime of intellectual property rights. As for the right
of publicity, a body of law disdained by his contemporaries, he took a
characteristically pragmatic justification for this right, which he termed the
"associative value of personality." 20 His concept of associative value, which
he argues is the essential basis for the right of publicity, relates to the realities
of the marketplace and the role that celebrities play in selling goods or
9Id. at 1360-61.
10 1d at 1362.
11 Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974).
12 Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 130-31 (Wis. 1979)
(referencing "Crazylegs" Elroy Hirsch, a football star).
13 Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 1983)
(referencing "Here's Johnny" Johnny Carson, a television host).
14 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1988).
15 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993).
16 Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1998).
17 Leaffer, supra note 5, at 1362.
1 8 See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 35-40 (1997) (discussing
a few of the different rationales for the right to privacy).
19 See generally Leaffer, supra note 5.20 See generally Halpern, Publicity, supra note 1; Halpern, Associative Value, supra
note 1.
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services.2 1 When a company desires to promote a product, it will often turn to
the use of celebrities, paying substantially for the privilege. Thus, the sale of
an individual's persona to promote commercial products has developed into
"big business." 22 The right of publicity gives legal recognition to the value that
celebrities provide to the promotion of goods and services. As Halpern put it:
The phenomenon of celebrity generates commercial value. A celebrity's
persona confers an associative value-an economic impact-upon the
marketability of a product. As the Third Circuit ... observed, "[a] famous
individual's name, likeness, and endorsement carry value and an
unauthorized use harms the person both by diluting the value of the name and
depriving that individual of compensation." Whatever the social merit of
commercialization of personality or the morality of commercializing one's
identity, the economic reality persists. 23
Halpern discounted the critics of the right who questioned its moral or
economic soundness, and whether the right encourages individual creativity.
To him, all this was beside the point:
At bottom lies unhappiness with the reality of celebrity value, the
"commodification" of personality. For many, a certain moral repugnance
attaches to the commercialization of fame. As a purely personal matter, I
suppose I would be happier intellectually in a society that did not endow fame
with an economic value apart from the activity that creates the notoriety. But
my personal aversion to market reality does not change that reality nor should
it serve as a basis for devaluing a legal construct that recognizes that reality. 24
In effect, whatever its conceptual underpinnings, the reality of associative
value is an unavoidable and omnipresent fact of our commercial lives.
Thus, when the courts deal with the right of publicity, they do not create the
value; rather, as a matter of policy, the courts determine the extent to which
one must compensate the person who has generated the economic value for
use of the persona and the limits of the celebrity's control over the
exploitation of his or her personality.2 5
Halpern also took a realistic position concerning the extension of the right
of publicity beyond mere name or likeness. In his view, it should not be
important how a defendant appropriates the plaintiff's identity, but whether the
defendant actually did so.26 He would point to Motschenbacher, Carson, and
21 See Halpern, Associative Value, supra note 1, at 856-69.2 2 Id at 856.23 1d at 857 (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting McFarland v.
Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1994)).24 Id at 870-71 (footnote omitted).2 5 Id at 858.26 Id at 860-63.
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Midler, cases that demonstrate the impracticality of extending the right of
publicity to a bright-line list enumerating the specific means of appropriating
identity. 27 After all, for some people, other indicia of persona may encompass
traits, characteristics, mannerisms, or even paraphernalia unique to that
person.28 Thus, a rule that would limit the right of publicity to specific
methods of appropriation, such as name or likeness, would undermine, even
eviscerate, the associative value of personality. Of course, Halpern was not
arguing that all identifiers used by third parties should constitute actionable
appropriation. Those identifiers that merit protection must unambiguously
identify the person so that their use would enable "the defendant to appropriate
the commercial value of the person's identity."29
Halpern made the point that the associative value basis for the right of
publicity applies only to cases of commercial exploitation. Thus, the right of
publicity does not ordinarily encompass "the use of a person's identity in news
reporting, commentary, entertainment, or in [sic] works of fiction or nonfiction
or in advertising that is incidental to such uses." 30 The "newsworthy,
entertainment, critical, satirical, or parodic uses" are privileged because they
go past the unadorned act of appropriation. 31
IV. CONCLUSION
In revisiting Halpern's 1995 article, I am particularly impressed by his
common sense, pragmatic approach to the right of publicity. This was his
attitude about the many other legal issues in our chosen field. Sometimes I
disagreed with Halpern on certain issues, and he was persistent in trying to
convince me that I was wrong. I will miss those exchanges. In my discussions
with Halpern through the years, I have taken a less than enthusiastic view
concerning the right of publicity. In my view, the right of publicity was born
out of expediency, and has evolved in an explosive if not haphazard manner,
leaving it to the courts and commentators to provide a sound justification for
the right. The literature is voluminous, and I have yet to encounter totally
persuasive justification for this all-inclusive right for the misappropriation of
persona. On review of the literature, I am more convinced than ever that
whatever interests the publicity right serves, trademark law, unfair competition
law, and the growing law of false endorsement under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act can satisfy those interests.32 Despite my somewhat jaundiced
27 See cases cited supra notes 11, 13-14.28 Halpern, Associate Value, supra note 1, at 860.
2 9 1d. at 863 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d
(AM. LAW INST. 1995)).30 1d. at 868 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47).
31 Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Rogers v.
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1005 (2d Cir. 1989); Halpern, Associative Value, supra note 1, at
868. 32 See generally Leaffer, supra note 5.
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view about the right of publicity, I believe that Halpern's rationale for this
controversial right is based on a sound ethical principal. Simply put, one who
has created celebrity value should be the one to benefit from it, rather than a
free rider who uses it and dissipates its value to obtain a commercial
advantage.
